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THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TRIGGER PRICE AND PUNISHMENT PERIOD IN 




‡ and Carlos Seixas
§ 
Abstract 
Green and Porter (1984) made a huge contribution to Industrial Organization Theory 
where a trigger price is defined by firms and whenever the price falls below this trigger 
price, the firms cease to produce at the monopoly level and enter into a punishment 
period. Our goal with this paper is to define, endogenously in the model, relationships 
between the trigger price and the punishment period, which were set exogenously in the 
original paper. 
Keywords: Green and Porter (1984); trigger price; punishment period. 
JEL classification: L13, L20 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
Green and Porter (1984) made a huge contribution to Industrial Organization Theory by 
considering a dynamic model in which the firms of an industry are confronted with the 
problems of detecting and deterring cheating in an agreement in a context of imperfect 
monitoring.  Firms  decide  the  quantity  to  produce  and  observe  the  market  price  to 
imperfectly infer the aggregate production. This imperfection results from the existence 
of uncertainty in the demand of the goods which may lead to lower prices even if the 
firms do not overproduce. 
In the model presented in Green and Porter (1984), a trigger price is defined by firms 
and whenever the price falls below this trigger price, the firms cease to produce at the 
monopoly level (or collusion previously defined output) and enter into a punishment 
What Green and Porter (1984) suggest is that the existence of low prices and higher 
production  for  certain  periods  of  time  are  consistent  with  the  existence  of  a 
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noncooperative  collusion  and  may  not  be  a  result  of  price  wars  and/or  a  result  of 
abortive attempts to form a cartel. It represented a new insight on collusive behavior. 
They  defended  that  public  intervention  may  be  required  in  order  to  increase 
competition. 
In Green and Porter (1984) model, both the trigger price and the punishment period T 
are exogenous. In our point of view, there would be gains by making endogenous these 
parameters since then we can see how they depend on the strategies of the firms. Then, 
this represents the objective of this paper, that is, to create combinations of trigger price 
and punishment period that are optimal in the point of view of firms. In addition, it is 
our objective to show that these different combinations may lead to lower or higher 
volatility in the markets in analysis.  
A similar exercise to ours was made in Tirole (1988) where it is tried to find a optimal 
value  for  the  punishment  period.  However,  Tirole  (1988)  has  different  assumptions 
specially regarding competition which is made on prices instead of quantities like in 
Green and Porter (1984) and on the demand which has only two possible outcomes each 
period. In addition, Tirole (1988) follows a different approach. In the paper’s model, it 
is determined the optimal punishment period with a per-period analysis instead of pre-
game implicit contract as in our case (for a wider clarification see note 2). This yields 
different  results  as  one  can  see  point  3.
2.  THE MODEL 
When we consider different combinations of T and  ̅ , we are implicitly changing the 
relationship between the expected long run profits while colluding and the expected 
long  run  profits  when  producing  the  Cournot  levels.  For  instance,  if  the  time  in 
reversionary phase is longer, that is if T is higher, the total long-run profits in Cournot 
increases, ceteris paribus. In a given period of time, the total profits in collusion will be 
the  product  of  the  collusion  profits  in  each  period  times  the  number  of  periods  it 
occurs
1. The same occurs for the Cournot case but  the expected number of periods we 
are in Cournot once we enter in the reversionary period is given and is T-1 in Green and 
Porter (1984).  
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From the definition of the trigger price and the punishment period  results a proportion 
of long-run profits in collusion relatively to long-run profits in Cournot (given by K in 
the  equation  below).  Naturally,  firms  would  like  to  have  this  proportion  as  big  as 
possible if they stay in collusion since they earn more profits. In order to maximize this 
proportion, given the profit levels, this would imply changes in the expected number of 
periods  staying  in  Cournot  and  in  Collusion.  More  specifically,  this  would  imply  a 
lower expected number of periods staying in Cournot and the opposite in the case of 
collusion.  However,  for  a  given  time-horizon,  increasing  the  number  of  periods  in 
collusion relatively to Cournot would imply lower welfare and public discontentment. 
This means that firms have to face restrictions when maximizing this proportion of long 
run profits like the possibility of changes in habits of consumption. In addition, the 
public discontentment may lead to government and public institutions pressure and also 
the possibility of new entrants. Restrictions to K may be found in several papers like in 
Harrington  (2004a,  2004b,  2005).  In  the  first  two,  the  author  develops  theoretical 
models  in  which  pricing  in  cartels  is  analyzed  when  antitrust  authorities  exist.  In 
Harrington  (2005),  firms  face  a  profit  maximization  profit  problem  where  they 
maximize  their  present  value  of  income  flow  which  depends  on  the  profits  while 
colluding, the penalties if caught cheating and the probability of being caught. 
More formally: 
Π          ∗               =   ∗ Π        ∗ (  − 1) ⟺ 
⟺               =
 ∗Π￿￿￿￿￿￿￿∗     
Π￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
2      (1) 
Where  Π           is  the  profit  while  producing  the  amount  of  the  collusive 
behavior.             represents  the  expected  number  of  periods  of  collusion. 
Π       corresponds to the Cournot Profits and T-1 is the length of the punishment. K 
represents the proportion of the profits. 
3 
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It is not direct from the formula above the relationship between T and  ̅. However, 
              depends on  ̅ and by solving this connection we may find the relationship 
between T and  ̅. 
We know from statistics that  
              =
 
    (     )        (2) 
Proof: 
              = 1 ∗        <      + 2 ∗        >      ∗        <      + 3
∗        >       ∗        <      + ⋯+   ∗        >        
∗        <      
Assuming that the firms are colluding in the first period as is assumed in Green and 
Porter (1984) this expected value is built as follows. In the first term of the right-hand 
side, the price is below the trigger price so in the following period, firms enter into the 
punishment phase. In the second term, in the first period the price is above the trigger 
price while in the second one it falls below the trigger price implying that the collusion 
remains  for  two  periods.  Considering  this  for  n  periods  yield  the  equality  above. 
Continuing the resolution of the proof: 
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       <     
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Like in the Green and Porter (1984), the Demand Function is of the type: 
   =     ∑              (3) 5 
 
We  make  here  an  additional  assumption  regarding      distribution.  Just  for  calculus 
simplification and easy of interpretation we assume that    has an uniform distribution 
like  
 ~   ,              (4) 
When setting Π          it is implicit that all firms follow the collusive behavior so each 
firm  produces  a  constant    
4.  As  a  result,  the  total  economy  production,  ∑  ,  is 
constant. Moreover the function P(.) does not change with time so we using equations 
(3) and (4)  can state that: 
 ￿
  ∑ ￿￿ ~	   ,   =   
 ￿￿￿
  ∑ ￿ ,
 ￿￿￿
  ∑ ￿        (5) 
Additionally from (2): 
 
            =               ⇔
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Using the properties of the uniform distribution, equation (5) and given that P=  ∑   : 
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Using (6): 
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4 Note that the time subscript is not necessary since the level of production is pre-determined like in 
Green  and  Porter  (1984)  and  all  firms  are  assumed  to  abide  by  the  contract  requisites  leading  to 
unchangable production through time. 6 
 
Following footnote 4, we are again not taking into account the idiosyncrasies of each 
period so the time subscript is not required. This together with   ∑     =   ∑   , 
leads to: 
  =
  ￿￿￿  ￿￿￿ ∗Π￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
 ∗Π￿￿￿￿￿￿￿∗      +             (7) 
3.  CONCLUSION 
In order to understand equation (7) is important to note first that there is an inverse 
relationship  between   and               .  As  one  can  conclude  the  higher  is  the 
proportion of profits (K), ceteris paribus, the lower is   in order to guarantee that the 
expected number of periods while colluding is greater. Given that all the remaining 
variables  are  constant,  to  increase  the  proportion  of  profits,  each  firm  has  to  be  in 
collusion for a longer period implying a lower trigger price.  
Additionally, the lower is the ratio of profits Π         /Π        , ceteris paribus, the 
higher  has  to  be     to  increase  the  expected  long  run  profits  while  colluding.  For 
instance, if the profits in collusion increases, the number of periods in collusion must 
decrease implying a higher trigger price.  
The most important relationship is that the higher is T, ceteris paribus, the lower has to 
be   so that our condition holds. The higher is the punishment period the higher has to 
be the expected number of periods of colluding so production would less likely change 
from one period to other, meaning that a lower trigger price is required. This implies 
that the volatility on the market regarding prices and quantities would depend on the 
definition of the combination of trigger price and T. In the particular case considered, 
with higher punishment period, the volatility would decrease ceteris paribus. 
These results differ from Tirole (1988) where it is obtained an incentive incompatibility 
constraint. Thisis used as constraint to the maximization of the present discounted value 
of a firm’s profits from period t on, leading to the conclusion that the punishment period 
should be as low as possible. This conclusion results from the fact that, the longer is the 
punishment period the lower are the expected profits. As one can see, this differs from 
our results. In our case, however, a low punishment period would lead to higher market 
volatility and no gains in profits. 7 
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